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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Elvin Frances Nebrensky appeals from the district court’s Restitution Order,
entered after Nebrensky pled guilty to sexual battery of a minor child. On appeal,
Nebrensky argues the state failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a causal
connection between the victims’ economic losses and the charged criminal conduct.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In June 2014, 58-year-old Nebrensky met and befriended 16-year-old H.P. (PSI,
p.92.) On the night they met, Nebrensky “told [H.P.] that if he ever needed a blow job to
let him know.” (PSI, pp.92, 103.)
Over the next several months, Nebrensky engaged in what law enforcement later
characterized as “child grooming” behavior – i.e., “actions deliberately undertaken with
the goal of befriending and establishing an emotional connection with a child, to lower
the child’s inhibitions in order to sexually abuse the child.” (PSI, p.93.) Nebrensky
served H.P. alcohol on multiple occasions, gave him cash and gifts, “friended” him and
sent him hundreds of messages on Facebook, and repeatedly invited him to Nebrensky’s
home.

(PSI, pp.92-104.)

On one occasion while H.P. was at Nebrensky’s house,

Nebrensky “again offered to give [H.P.] a blow job.” (PSI, p.92.) H.P. told Nebrensky,
“No,” but Nebrensky “kept pestering” him. (PSI, p.92.)
On July 6, 2014, Nebrensky and H.P. exchanged several Facebook messages.
(PSI, pp.95-98.) During the exchange, Nebrensky told H.P. that he “really like[d]” H.P.,
that he “love[d] giving a great BJ,” that he “wanted to give [H.P.] head so bad tonight,”
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and that he “want[ed] [H.P.] to cum in [his] mouth.” (PSI, pp.95-96.) He also sent H.P. a
picture of his erect penis. (PSI, pp.92, 96.) H.P., who had fallen asleep after taking one
of his mother’s sleeping pills, discovered the picture when he awoke and “sent a picture
of his own penis back to” Nebrensky. (PSI, pp.92, 97.) After receiving the picture,
Nebrensky responded, “I want that,” and “when can I suck you?”

(PSI, p.97.)

Nebrensky repeatedly asked H.P., both during that Facebook conversation and in later
Facebook exchanges that occurred over the next several weeks, when the two would be
able to meet. (PSI, pp.97-99.)
On August 30, 2014, Nebrensky sent H.P. a Facebook message asking if H.P.
could “get out to get ice cream and cookies.” (PSI, p.98.) H.P. told Nebrensky that he
“could” and that he had just taken “some really good pills,” which he described as
“Hydros.” (PSI, pp.98-99.) Nebrensky expressed an interest in buying some of H.P.’s
pills and, after some discussion, made the following offer: “I will give you 50 and you
give me the pills and I give you head.” (PSI, pp.98-99.) H.P. accepted Nebrensky’s offer
and, shortly thereafter, Nebrensky picked H.P. up and took him back to Nebrensky’s
house, where Nebrensky performed oral sex on H.P. (PSI, pp.93, 100, 103.)
After their August 30th meeting, Nebrensky continued to communicate with H.P.
on Facebook. (PSI, pp.100-01.) He and H.P. also saw each other in person, with their
last meeting occurring at a restaurant on November 19, 2014. (PSI, pp.92, 103-04.)
During that contact, Nebrensky told H.P. that he should “dump” his girlfriend because
Nebrensky “could pleasure him better.” (PSI, pp.92, 104.) Nebrensky also told H.P., “I
love you,” and said he would buy H.P. a Ferrari if H.P. married him. (PSI, p.104.)
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The state charged Nebrensky with one count of sexual battery of a minor for
having performed oral sex on H.P. on August 30, 2014, and with one count of sexual
exploitation of a child for having possessed or accessed a photograph of H.P.’s penis on
July 6, 2014. (R., pp.33-34.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Nebrensky pled guilty to
sexual battery of a minor, and the state dismissed the sexual exploitation charge. (R.,
pp.35-39, 41-42.) As part of the plea agreement, Nebrensky agreed to “pay restitution:
for all counts originally charged.” (R., p.37 (capitalization modified).) The district court
accepted Nebrensky’s plea and imposed a unified sentence of life, with six years fixed. 1
(R., pp.49-51.) The court reserved jurisdiction to determine restitution at a later date.
(R., p.50.)
In August 2016, the state filed a Memorandum of Restitution requesting
restitution in the amount of $9,587.96 to H.P.’s mother and $1,928.16 to the Idaho
Industrial Commission Crime Victim’s Compensation Program (hereinafter “the CVCP”)
for medical expenses they incurred on H.P.’s behalf.

(R., pp.80-129.)

The state

subsequently amended its restitution request to reflect additional medical expenses
incurred by H.P.’s mother. (See R., pp.132-63 (Amended Memorandum of Restitution
and attachments), 164-222 (Second Memorandum of Restitution and attachments).)
Ultimately, the state requested restitution in the amount of $11,883.29 to H.P.’s mother
and $1,928.16 to the CVCP, for a total restitution amount of $13,811.45. (R., pp.164-65.)

1

Nebrensky’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Nebrensky,
Docket No. 43418, 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 359 (Idaho App., Jan. 29, 2016)
(contained in the Clerk’s Record at pp.62-63).
3

The district court held a restitution hearing, at which H.P.’s mother and a victim
advocate employed by the Kootenai County Prosecutor’s Office testified in support of the
state’s restitution request. (See Tr., pp.19-95.) In summary, H.P.’s mother testified that
H.P. had suffered numerous psychological and related physiological injuries as a result of
having been sexually abused by Nebrensky, and that her out-of-pocket expenses for the
treatment of those injuries totaled $11,883.29. (Tr., p.22, L.1 – p.33, L.11, p.56, L.1 –
p.85, L.25; see also State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 (lists of out-of-pocket payments and
corresponding insurance documents detailing the claims and expenses at issue).) H.P.’s
mother testified that she believed Nebrensky had sexually abused H.P. for a period of
over five months, beginning in June 2014 (Tr., p.57, Ls.4-22, p.68, Ls.18-21, p.78, L.1 –
p.79, L.15), but the restitution she sought was limited to the out-of-pocket payments she
made for H.P.’s medical treatments that occurred after July 6, 2014—the date of the
charged sexual exploitation (see State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 (showing out-of-pocket medical
expenses incurred between July 15, 2014, and June 29, 2016)).

The state’s victim

advocate testified that the CVCP also made payments on H.P.’s behalf; State’s Exhibit 3,
admitted during the victim advocate’s testimony, shows the total amount the CVCP paid
was $1,928.16. (Tr., p.33, L.20 – p.37, L.24; State’s Exhibit 3.)
At the conclusion of the evidence, Nebrensky stipulated to pay restitution in the
amount of $1,169.36. (Tr., p.90, Ls.7-12; see also Defendant’s Exhibits A and B.) He
asked the court to decline to award restitution for the remaining requested amounts,
however, arguing that H.P.’s mother was “an angry parent,” and that whether H.P.’s
medical expenses were for injuries related to the charged crimes was “better the province
of an expert.” (Tr., p.89, L.8 – p.90, L.6; see also p.26, Ls.7-19, p.30, Ls.19-24 (objecting
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to admission of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 on basis that “how [H.P.’s mother’s out-ofpocket expenses] relate to the victim and this particular offense would be more in the
province of expert testimony”).) The district court rejected Nebrensky’s argument and
ordered restitution in the full amount requested by the state, finding the state had “proven
well beyond a preponderance of the evidence that every … item requested [was] related
to the abuse perpetrated by the defendant.” (Tr., p.91, L.21 – p.92, L.2; R., pp.228-29.)
Nebrensky timely appealed from the district court’s Restitution Order. (R., pp.230-34.)

5

ISSUES
Nebrensky states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the State meet its burden to show a causal connection between
Mr. Nebrensky’s two charged offenses and H.P.’s injuries?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr.
Nebrensky to pay the full amount of restitution even though he had
no ability to pay?

(Revised Brief of Appellant (hereinafter “Appellant’s brief”), p.6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Nebrensky failed to show the district court abused its discretion in awarding
restitution to H.P.’s mother and to the CVCP for the economic losses they sustained, on
behalf of H.P., as a direct result of Nebrensky’s criminal conduct?

6

ARGUMENT
Nebrensky Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Awarding
Restitution To The Victim’s Mother And To The CVCP For The Economic Losses They
Sustained As A Direct Result Of Nebrensky’s Criminal Conduct
A.

Introduction
Nebrensky challenges the district court’s Restitution Order, arguing the state

failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection between H.P.’s
injuries and Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-27.) He also
argues the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay the full amount of
restitution requested by the state because “he had no ability to pay.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.27-28 (capitalization modified, underlining omitted).) Nebrensky’s arguments fail. A
review of the record shows the state presented substantial evidence to support the district
court’s finding that H.P.’s injuries—and the resulting economic losses to H.P.’s mother
and the CVCP for the treatment of those injuries—were the direct result of Nebrensky’s
criminal conduct. Moreover, Nebrensky has failed to show the district court abused its
discretion by exercising its statutory authority to order full restitution, despite
Nebrensky’s immediate inability to pay.

B.

Standard Of Review
“‘Whether to order restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court’s

discretion and is guided by consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 195304(7).’” State v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 919, 393 P.3d 576, 579 (2017) (brackets
omitted) (quoting State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011); State v.
Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37, 43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002)). In determining whether
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the district court has abused its discretion, the appellate court considers “whether the
district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with relevant legal standards; and (3)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Id. (citing Swallow v. Emergency Med. Of
Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003)).
“The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of fact to be decided by
the trial court.” Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401 (citing Cramer v. Slater, 146
Idaho 868, 875, 204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)). “The district court’s factual findings with
regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence.”
Id. (citing State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822, 242 P.3d 189, 192 (Ct. App. 2010));
accord State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.” Straub, 153 Idaho at 885, 292 P.3d at 276 (citing Kinney v. Tupperware
Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990)); accord Wisdom, 161 Idaho at 919,
393 P.3d at 579.

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court’s Finding That H.P.’s Injuries,
And The Economic Losses H.P.’s Mother And The CVCP Sustained For
Treatment Of Those Injuries, Were Caused By Nebrensky’s Criminal Conduct
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to “order a defendant found guilty of

any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to the
victim.” “[W]ith the consent of the parties,” the court may also “order restitution to
victims, and/or any other person or entity, for economic loss or injury for crimes which
are not adjudicated or are not before the court.” I.C. § 19-5304(9). For purposes of

8

restitution, “economic loss” includes, among other things, “direct out-of-pocket losses or
expenses, such as medical expenses resulting from the criminal conduct.” I.C. § 195304(1)(a) (emphasis added). “Therefore, in order for restitution to be appropriate, there
must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted
and the injuries suffered by the victim.” State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d
398, 401 (2011).
Causation, for purposes of the restitution statutes, “consists of actual cause and
true proximate cause.” Id. (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750,
757 (2009)). The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated the distinction between actual and
proximate cause as follows:
Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event produced
a particular consequence. The “but for” test is used in circumstances
where there is only one actual cause or where two or more possible causes
were not acting concurrently. On the other hand, true proximate cause
deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm would
flow from the negligent conduct. In analyzing proximate cause, this Court
must determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly
unusual that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities
of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably
expected the injury to occur.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). The determinations of actual cause and
proximate cause are both factual questions. Id.
In cases such as this, where restitution for “treatment expenses are sought, the
State bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing, which may include evidence
that would be inadmissible in a civil trial, that the expenses were reasonable and
necessary to treat injuries caused by the defendant’s criminal conduct.” State v. Card,
146 Idaho 111, 114-15, 190 P.3d 930, 933-34 (Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Ultimately, an award of restitution must “be based upon the preponderance of evidence
submitted to the court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator.”
I.C. § 19-5304(6). “Strict application of evidentiary rules is not required for proof of
restitution claims,” however, as the restitution statute itself “explicitly lowers one
evidentiary bar in restitution hearings by allowing the court to consider ‘such hearsay as
may be contained in the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise
provided to the court.’” Card, 146 Idaho at 114, 190 P.3d at 933 (quoting I.C. § 195304(6)).
In this case, Nebrensky’s liability for restitution arose both from his guilty plea to
sexual battery of a minor (R., pp.35-37) and from his promise, pursuant to his plea
agreement, to pay restitution for the dismissed sexual exploitation charge (R., p.37). See
I.C. § 19-5304(2) and (9).

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered

Nebrensky to pay restitution in the amount of $11,883.29 to H.P.’s mother and $1,928.16
to the CVCP, finding the state had “proven well beyond a preponderance of the evidence
that every … item requested [was] related to the abuse perpetrated by the defendant.”
(Tr., p.91, L.21 – p.92, L.2; R., pp.228-29.) Contrary to Nebrensky’s arguments on
appeal, a review of the record shows the state presented substantial evidence to support
the district court’s restitution award and, more specifically, its finding that the victims’ 2
economic losses were caused by Nebrensky’s criminal conduct.

2

Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) and (iv), respectively, define “victim” as “a person or
entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s criminal
conduct …” and as “[a] person or entity who suffers economic loss because such person
or entity has made payments to or on behalf of a directly injured victim pursuant to a
contract ….” Nebrensky has never disputed that H.P.’s mother and the CVCP are
“victims” within the meaning of the restitution statute.
10

1.

H.P.’s Mother’s Out-Of-Pocket Expenses

H.P.’s mother sought restitution in the amount of $11,883.29 to cover the out-ofpocket expenses she incurred for the treatment of H.P.’s psychological and physical
injuries that she attributed directly to Nebrensky’s criminal conduct. In support of that
restitution request, the state presented H.P.’s mother’s testimony, as well as State’s
Exhibits 1 and 2, which documented H.P.’s medical expenses, and his mother’s share
thereof, between July 15, 2014, and June 29, 2016. (Tr., p.22, L.1 – p.33, L.13, p.56, L.1
– p.85, L.25; State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.) When asked on direct examination whether H.P.
had “suffered significantly in terms of mental health as a result of the crime,” H.P.’s
mother testified: “He has serious PTSD, he has anxiety, um, he’s developed [tics],[3] and
it continues to be a day-to-day struggle for” him. (Tr., p.23, Ls.17-21.) She testified that
H.P. had “been routinely seen for mental health issues by professional care providers,”
that she was “with him at most appointments,” and that all of the out-of-pocket expenses
reflected in State’s Exhibit 1 were true and accurate and “related to mental health issues
in terms of treatment and pharmacy prescriptions and other things resulting from the
crime for which [H.P.] was victimized.” (Tr., p.24, L.12 – p.25, L.1, p.27, Ls.10-15,
p.31, Ls.3-8; see also Tr., p.27, L.19 – p.28, L.1 (H.P.’s mother affirming that she
“purposefully excluded … non-event, crime-related information” from State’s Exhibit
1).) She similarly testified that all of the out-of-pocket expenses reflected in State’s
Exhibit 2 were true and accurate and “relate[d] to [H.P.’s] mental health issues as
exacerbated by the crime.” (Tr., p.28, L.5 – p.31, L.12; see also p.33, Ls.2-7 (H.P.’s

As noted by Nebrensky’s appellate counsel, the word “tics” is consistently misspelled
“ticks” in the transcript. (See Appellant’s brief, p.4 n.4.)
3
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mother affirming that “all of the information” in State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 was “relevant
and related to the offense for what Mr. Nebrensky was charged with”).)
After Nebrensky attempted in his own case-in-chief to impeach H.P.’s mother’s
testimony that all of the out-of-pocket expenses documented in State’s Exhibits 1 and 2
were for treatment of injuries caused by Nebrensky’s criminal conduct (see
-- Tr., p.38, L.10
– p.55, L.4; Defendant’s Exhibits A and B), the state recalled H.P.’s mother to address
Nebrensky’s concerns regarding the causation issue (Tr., p.56, Ls.1-24.). On recall,
H.P.’s mother testified, based on her review of “over 5,000 pages” of Facebook
Messenger exchanges, that Nebrensky had abused H.P. “over a five-and-a-half-month
period,” beginning in June 2014. (Tr., p.57, Ls.4-22.) She testified that, at that time, she
“started not being able to identify what was wrong with [H.P.],” and she “started to have
to take him to doctors” for, among other things, gastrointestinal issues. (Tr., p.57, L.23 –
p.58, L.9.) According to H.P.’s mother, H.P. “could not go to the bathroom for three
weeks, and he had to go to the emergency room four days in a row and be admitted into
Sacred Heart Medical Center because of the trauma he endured.” (Tr., p.65, Ls.3-10.)
H.P.’s mother attended H.P.’s medical appointments and was told by H.P.’s doctors that
H.P.’s gastrointestinal issues, for which he required an abdominal CT scan and a
colonoscopy, were the result of PTSD and were “directly related to [H.P.’s] abuse.” (Tr.,
p.58, Ls.3-9, p.59, L.17 – p.60, L.16, p.62, Ls.7-22, p.64, L.25 – p.65, L.10.)
In addition to developing gastrointestinal issues, H.P. also developed several tics
after being abused by Nebrensky. (Tr., p.61, Ls.2-25, p.69, L.12 – p.70, L.11.) H.P.’s
mother testified, based on what she learned from H.P.’s psychiatrist, that the tics were
related to H.P.’s medications and to the PTSD he suffered as a result of having been
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abused. (Tr., p.58, Ls.3-9, p.61, Ls.14-17, p.69, L.12 – p.70, L.11.) The tics were “quite
severe” and H.P. “needed physical therapy to try to relax the muscles caused by the
[tics].” (Tr., p.61, Ls.18-21.) He also saw a naturopath for “relaxation methods to help
him with his anxiety.” (Tr., p.61, Ls.21-22.) H.P.’s mother testified that both H.P.’s
“physical therapy and his holistic medicine doctor [were] 100 percent directly related” to
the treatment of the tics H.P. suffered as a result of his PTSD. (Tr., p.69, L.25 – p.70,
L.3.) She also testified that two of H.P.’s tics – a neck and shoulder tic and a throat tic –
required additional medical treatment, including diagnostic radiology of H.P.’s upper
extremities, a joint injection to try to relieve the tension that was causing the tic in his
shoulder, and a tonsillectomy. (Tr., p.70, L.20 – p.71, L.8, p.71, L.19 – p.72, L.24, p.81,
L.9 – p.83, L.5.)
A number of insurance documents included in State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 indicate
that the service for which H.P.’s mother was seeking reimbursement was “Patient view
only.” (See, generally, State’s Exhibits 1 and 2; Appellant’s brief, Appendix A, pp.1-2.)
When asked about those entries, H.P.’s mother testified:

“Patient view only is all

psychiatric. My son was hospitalized inpatient psychiatric multiple occasions.” (Tr.,
p.75, Ls.11-17; see also p.76, Ls.19-22.) While H.P. and his doctors are the only people
who “get to view those records,” H.P.’s mother testified that she was present at all but a
few of the sessions between H.P. and his psychiatrist and that “[o]ne hundred percent” of
those sessions “had to do with [H.P.’s] contact and communication with Mr. Nebrensky.”
(Tr., p.75, L.17 – p.76, L.9.) She also testified that H.P. received other treatment for his
PTSD, including chiropractic care and acupuncture “to help calm anxiety.” (Tr., p.76,
L.23 – p.77, L.4.)
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Contrary to Nebrensky’s assertions on appeal, the foregoing evidence is
substantial evidence supporting the district court’s award of restitution to H.P.’s mother
and, more specifically, its finding that the state proved “well beyond a preponderance of
the evidence that every … item requested [was] related to the abuse perpetrated by”
Nebrensky.” (Tr., p.91, L.21 – p.92, L.2.) H.P.’s mother documented the out-of-pocket
expenses she incurred for H.P.’s mental health and medical treatment between July 15,
2014, and June 29, 2016, and that accounting was substantiated by insurance documents
that included the claim and charge details for every expense for which H.P.’s mother
sought reimbursement.

(See State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.)

Although the insurance

documents provided only generalized descriptions of the types of services for which
H.P.’s mother was being billed (e.g., “Physical Therapy,” “Professional Component,”
“Medical Care,” “Surgery,” “Ancillaries,” “Patient View Only,” etc.), H.P.’s mother
testified in detail regarding the nature of many of the services—as well as why the
services were necessary, and she repeatedly testified that all of the expenses for which she
was seeking reimbursement were for treatment of H.P.’s mental health and related
medical issues that, H.P.’s doctors informed her, were directly related to the abuse
Nebrensky perpetrated on H.P. (Tr., p.23, L.3 – p.26, L.6, p.27, L.10 – p.28, L.1, p.28,
Ls.16-24, p.30, Ls.1-18, p.31, Ls.3-12, p.57, L.4 – p.64, L.3, p.64, L.25 – p.85, L.21; see
also PSI, pp.158, 186 (June 9, 2015 letter from H.P.’s psychiatrist noting H.P.’s
diagnoses of severe PTSD and Recurrent Major Depression and explaining H.P.’s
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“symptoms started following his sexual abuse and are very severe”). 4)

From this

evidence the district court could, and did, reasonably conclude that H.P.’s injuries, and all
of the documented out-of-pocket expenses for the treatment thereof, were actually and
proximately caused by Nebrensky’s criminal conduct.
Nebrensky challenges the district court’s award of restitution to H.P.’s mother,
arguing the state failed to prove, and the district court erroneously found, that all of the
medical expenses for which H.P.’s mother sought reimbursement were actually caused by
Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-23, 26-27.) Nebrensky
correctly notes that, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304(1) and the terms of his plea agreement, he
was only required to pay restitution for H.P.’s medical expenses resulting from the sexual
battery and sexual exploitation offenses with which he was charged. (Appellant’s brief,
p.20.) He argues, however, that a review of H.P.’s mother’s testimony “shows that she
did not segregate Mr. Nebrensky’s two charged offenses from any other uncharged and
unproven crimes (or even non-criminal behavior) when identifying H.P.’s injuries” and
that she instead “considered every interaction starting in June 2014 and continuing for the
next five and one-half months as the crime for which Mr. Nebrensky had to pay
restitution.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.19-20.) He advances a similar challenge to the district
court’s restitution ruling, contending it was based on “all of the alleged conduct, whether
a charged offense or not.” (Appellant’s brief, p.26.) While the state acknowledges that

4

As acknowledged by Nebrensky’s appellate counsel (see Appellant’s brief, p.22),
although the letter from H.P.’s psychiatrist was not admitted at the restitution hearing, it
was submitted in conjunction with the sentencing materials and, as such, is among the
items this Court may consider in determining whether the evidence in the record supports
the district court’s restitution award. See I.C. § 19-5304(6).
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H.P.’s mother repeatedly expressed a belief, based on information provided to her by law
enforcement, that Nebrensky began abusing H.P. in June 2014, Nebrensky’s assertion that
it is impossible to tell which medical expenses were actually caused by Nebrensky’s
charged criminal conduct is belied by a review of the record and the applicable law.
In order to prove Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct was the actual cause of
H.P.’s injuries that were the subject of H.P.’s mother’s restitution request, the state was
required to prove either that the injuries would not have occurred “but for” the charged
conduct, or that the charged “conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the
injur[ies], even if two or more possible causes may have produced the injur[ies].” State
v. Wisdom, 161 Idaho 916, 921, 393 P.3d 576, 581 (2017) (citations omitted) Although
Nebrensky appears to argue otherwise, under the latter test, the state was not required to
prove that Nebrensky’s charged conduct was the sole cause of H.P.’s injuries; rather, the
state was required to prove only that the charged conduct was a substantial factor among
potentially “multiple independent forces that may have caused or contributed to the
harm.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Application of this test to the facts
of this case shows the state met its burden.
H.P.’s mother testified that H.P. began having gastrointestinal issues in June
2014, after Nebrensky and H.P. began exchanging Facebook messages. (Tr., p.57, L.4 –
p.57, L.4 – p.58, L.9.) Although H.P.’s mother testified that H.P. required medical
intervention for those issues in June 2014 (see, e.g., Tr., p.64, L.25 – p.65, L.10, p.74,
Ls.2-15, p.78, L.1 – p.79, L.11), H.P.’s mother did not seek reimbursement for any outof-pocket expenses related to those treatments (see State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.) Rather, the
first out-of-pocket expense for which H.P.’s mother sought reimbursement was for what
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appears to be a colonoscopy that H.P. underwent on July 15, 2014—nine days after the
date of the first charged offense (sexual exploitation). (Compare State’s Exhibit 1 with
Tr., p.66, L.23 – p.67, L.19.) While H.P.’s mother did not attribute that medical expense,
or any of the expenses that followed, to the sexual exploitation charge or sexual battery
charge specifically, she did testify that H.P.’s doctors had informed her that all of H.P.’s
mental health and related medical conditions were “directly related” to Nebrensky having
sexually abused him. (Tr., p.58, Ls.3-9, p.59, L.17 – p.60, L.16, p.69, L.12 – p.70, L.3,
p.75, L.15 – p.76, L.9.) Because the charged conduct was necessarily part of that abuse, it
was also necessarily a substantial factor that contributed to H.P.’s injuries—and to the
out-of-pocket expenses H.P.’s mother incurred for treatment of those injuries—after the
date of the first charged offense.
Nebrensky cites State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 372, 161 P.3d 689, 691 (Ct. App.
2007), for the proposition that he “was not required to pay restitution for any other
conduct, criminal or not, beyond the two charged offenses.” (Appellant’s brief, p.20.)
The state agrees with this proposition, generally. However, to the extent Nebrensky
contends Shafer supports his claim that the state failed to prove H.P.’s mother’s out-ofpocket expenses were actually caused by his charged criminal conduct, he is incorrect. In
fact, a review of the facts and reasoning of Shafer supports a determination that all of the
out-of-pocket expenses for which H.P.’s mother sought restitution were causally related
to Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct.
After Shafer pled guilty to leaving the scene of an injury accident, the district
court ordered him to pay restitution to the driver of the car with which his vehicle had
collided for the losses she had sustained as a result of the accident. Shafer, 114 Idaho at
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371-72, 161 P.3d 690-91. On appeal, Shafer argued the district court lacked authority to
order the restitution “because the victim’s losses did not result from the criminal act to
which he pleaded guilty.” Id. at 372, 161 P.3d at 691. Citing several provisions of I.C.
§ 19-5304 and prior precedent, the Idaho Court of Appeals agreed that, “except where the
parties have consented, a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for damages
stemming from separate, uncharged and unproven crimes.” Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372, 161
P.3d at 691 (citations omitted). The Court then analyzed whether Shafer’s criminal act of
leaving the scene of an injury accident actually caused the victim’s injuries and
determined it did not. Id. at 372-73, 161 P.3d at 691-92. Specifically, the Court reasoned
that the victim’s injuries resulted from the accident itself, not from Shafer’s later act of
leaving the scene. Id. at 373, 161 P.3d at 692. Because Shafer’s criminal conduct did not
cause the victim’s injuries, he could not be ordered to pay restitution absent his agreement
to the contrary. Id.
In this case, unlike in Shafer, the state’s evidence showed that all of the out-ofpocket expenses for which H.P.’s mother sought restitution were actually attributable, at
least in substantial part, to the two charged offenses for which Nebrensky agreed to pay
restitution. Not only did H.P.’s mother testify that all of the expenses were for treatment
of H.P.’s injuries that resulted from Nebrensky’s sexual abuse of him—which would
necessarily include the charged conduct, but the restitution request was specifically
limited to expenses that H.P.’s mother incurred after Nebrensky committed the first of the
two charged offenses. Nebrensky’s claim that he “was required to pay restitution for
medical expenses stemming from separate, uncharged and unproven crimes” in violation
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of the mandate in Shafer (see Appellant’s brief, p.23 (internal quotations and citation
omitted)) finds no support in the record.
Relying on State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 190 P.3d 930 (Ct. App. 2008),
Nebrensky next argues that H.P.’s mother was not qualified to testify as to the cause of
H.P.’s injuries. (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-23.) Specifically, he contends “the complex
nature of H.P.’s various injuries and passage of time between the alleged injuries and two
charged offenses required expert knowledge to establish causation.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.23.) The state acknowledges the holding in Card that a layperson is generally “not
permitted to testify regarding the cause of a medical condition” where such cause “is
wholly scientific or so far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the average
person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent opinion.”
Card, 146 Idaho at 115, 190 P.3d at 934. Contrary to Nebrensky’s assertions, however,
neither the reasoning nor result of Card compels a conclusion that H.P.’s mother’s
testimony was not sufficient to satisfy the state’s evidentiary burden of establishing a
causal connection between H.P.’s injuries and the two charged offenses under the facts of
this case.
After Card pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol, the trial court
ordered him to pay restitution to one of the occupants of a vehicle with which he had
collided for, among other things, the costs of massages, footbaths, and colon cleansings
she received in the months following the collision. Card, 146 Idaho at 112-13, 190 P.3d
at 931-32. Card challenged the restitution award on appeal, arguing the state failed to
show that the victim’s expenses for the massages, footbaths, and colon cleansings were
“direct economic losses resulting from his criminal conduct.” Id. at 114, 190 P.3d at 933.
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In addressing this issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals made the following
observations regarding the nature of the evidence supporting the restitution request:
There were no physicians’ letters or notes, hospital records or any medical
evidence of any kind indicating that a medical professional had found
either that [the victim] suffered from any identifiable physical condition
treatable by the massage, footbath or colon cleansings, or that such
condition was causally related to the automobile collision. [The victim’s]
own testimony included not even hearsay statements attributed to any
treatment provider that made such a causal connection. Thus, the request
for restitution for the challenged items was based solely on [the victim’s]
personal assessment of the cause of her physical complaints and her
personal determination of the type of treatment that would be beneficial.
Id. The Court then examined Card’s claim that the victim’s “testimony was neither
competent nor sufficient to prove that her claimed medical complaints were causally
related to the automobile collision” and, in doing so, found “helpful” its prior opinion in
Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services Co, Inc., 137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct.
App. 2002). Card, 146 Idaho at 115, 190 P.3d at 934. Quoting Dodge-Farrar, the Court
explained:
Although the admission of layperson opinion testimony is generally within
the discretion of the district court, the general rule in Idaho is that a
layperson is not permitted to testify regarding the cause of a medical
condition. This limitation applies, however, only where the subject matter
regarding the cause of the disease injury or death of a person is wholly
scientific or so far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the
average person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an
intelligent opinion. When alleged injuries are of a common nature and
arise from a readily identifiable cause, there is no need for the injured
party to produce expert testimony. …
Id. (quoting Dodge-Farrar, 137 Idaho at 841-43, 54 P.3d at 957-59 (internal citations
omitted)). Again quoting Dodge-Farrar, the Court provided further clarification of the
limitations of layperson testimony in this context, explaining that “[a]s the claimed
symptoms and treatment become more separated in time from” the mechanism of injury,
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“the causal relationship becomes more doubtful and tenuous, and expert testimony
becomes necessary to establish causation.” Id. (quoting Dodge-Farrar, 137 Idaho at 84143, 54 P.3d at 957-59). However, “[j]ust where within the time continuum the line must
be drawn to exclude lay testimony is necessarily a decision committed to the trial court’s
discretion based upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 116, 190
P.3d at 935 (quoting Dodge-Farrar, 137 Idaho at 841-43, 54 P.3d at 957-59).
Applying the rationale of Dodge-Farrar to the facts before it, the Card Court
concluded that the victim in that case “was not a competent witness” on the issues of
causation “even within the relaxed evidentiary standards applicable to restitution
hearings.” Id. As noted above, the state in Card presented no “medical evidence of any
kind indicating that a medical professional had found” the victim suffered from “any
identifiable physical condition” caused by the collision and treatable by the massages,
footbaths or colon cleansings at issue; nor did the victim testify that any treatment
provider made such a causal connection. Id. at 115, 190 P.3d at 934. Moreover, “[n]one
of the treatments were sought soon after the accident,” nor could it “be said that the
accident was such a readily identifiable cause of the claimed symptoms that the causal
relationship is a matter within the common knowledge and experience of the average
person.”

Id. at 116, 190 P.3d at 935.

Based upon these particular facts and

circumstances, the Court of Appeals reversed the award of restitution, holding that
“medical or expert evidence in some form was necessary in order to establish that [the
victim’s] symptoms were caused by Card’s criminal conduct and that the treatments she
chose were reasonable and necessary.” Id.
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The holding in Card that “medical or expert evidence in some form was
necessary” in order to establish causation in that case does not lead inexorably to the
conclusion, advanced by Nebrensky, that expert testimony was likewise necessary to
establish a causal connection between Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct and the
injuries for which H.P.’s mother sought restitution in this case. Unlike in Card, the
evidence of causation in this case was not based “solely on [H.P.’s mother’s] personal
assessment of the cause” of H.P.’s injuries or on “her personal determination of the type
of treatment that would be beneficial.” Card, 146 Idaho at 115, 190 P.3d at 934. Rather,
H.P.’s mother testified that H.P.’s doctors had informed her that all of H.P.’s
psychological and related medical conditions for which H.P. required treatment were
caused by Nebrensky’s sexual abuse. (Tr., p.58, Ls.3-9, p.59, L.17 – p.60, L.16, p.69,
L.12 – p.70, L.3, p.75, L.15 – p.76, L.9.) H.P.’s mother’s testimony in this regard is
corroborated by a letter from H.P.’s psychiatrist, in which the psychiatrist wrote that H.P.
“carries a diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, severe, and Recurrent Major
Depression,” that H.P.’s “symptoms started following his sexual abuse,” and that H.P.
would “require intensive treatment for a prolonged period of time.” (PSI, pp.158, 186.)
In addition, the state admitted documentary evidence showing that H.P.’s insurer paid its
contractual portion of the costs of H.P.’s psychiatric and medical treatments (see State’s
Exhibits 1 and 2), thus substantiating H.P.’s mother’s testimony that the treatments at
issue were medically necessary.
That several of the treatments for which H.P.’s mother sought reimbursement
occurred months after Nebrensky committed the two incidents of charged conduct did not
render H.P.’s mother’s testimony regarding H.P.’s need for the treatments and their causal
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relationship to the charged abuse unreliable. Again, H.P.’s mother testified that she was
present at most of H.P.’s psychiatric and medical appointments and was informed by
H.P.’s doctors that all of the injuries for which H.P. required treatment were caused by
Nebrensky’s sexual abuse. (Tr., p.58, Ls.3-9, p.59, L.17 – p.60, L.16, p.69, L.12 – p.70,
L.3, p.75, L.15 – p.76, L.9.) Additionally, H.P.’s psychiatrist specifically opined that
H.P.’s “symptoms started following his sexual abuse” and, due to their severity, H.P.
would “require treatment for a prolonged period of time.” (PSI, pp.158, 186.) While the
psychiatrist did not specifically identify the two charged incidents of abuse as having
been the sole cause of H.P.’s injuries, his determination that H.P.’s injuries were the
result of having been sexually abused – which would necessarily include the abuse that
was the subject of the two charged offenses – was sufficient to establish a causal
connection between H.P.’s ongoing injuries and the charged crimes.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the state met its burden of showing
actual causation, without the need for direct expert testimony. H.P.’s mother’s testimony,
though based on hearsay, was admissible under the relaxed evidentiary standards
applicable to restitution proceedings, see I.C. § 19-5304(6), and, together with the
insurance documents and psychiatrist’s letter, demonstrated that Nebrensky’s charged
conduct was at least a substantial factor that contributed to H.P.’s injuries.
Contrary to Nebrensky’s assertions, the state also presented sufficient evidence to
establish that Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct was the proximate cause of all of
H.P.’s injuries. “[P]roximate cause deals with ‘whether it was reasonably foreseeable that
such harm would flow from the negligent conduct.” State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602,
249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “In analyzing
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proximate cause, this Court must determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence
are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an inventory of the possibilities of
harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to
occur.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, Nebrensky “recognizes that it is not highly unusual to expect a victim
of sexual battery and sexual exploitation to require psychiatric care following those
experiences.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.25.)

He argues, however, that H.P.’s physical

injuries—such as the gastrointestinal issues and tics he developed following the sexual
abuse—were not injuries that a reasonable person would have expected to occur as a
result of the charged conduct. (Appellant’s brief, pp.25-26.) Nebrensky’s argument fails
both as a matter of law and of common sense.
To establish proximate cause, the state was not required to prove that it was
reasonably foreseeable that Nebrensky’s charged criminal conduct would cause H.P. to
suffer the precise physical injuries he did. Rather, the question before the district court in
deciding whether to award restitution for the out-of-pocket expenses associated with the
treatment of H.P.’s gastrointestinal issues and tics was whether it was whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that Nebrensky’s charged conduct would cause H.P. to suffer
some physical injury. See State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 393, 271 P.3d 1243, 1249 (Ct.
App. 2012). Just as it is “not highly unusual to expect a victim of sexual battery and
sexual exploitation to require psychiatric care following those experiences” (Appellant’s
brief, p.25), it is also not highly unusual to expect a sexual abuse victim’s psychological
trauma to manifest as physical illness, especially where, as here, the undisputed evidence
showed that H.P. suffered from severe PTSD.
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The state presented substantial evidence to establish that Nebrensky’s charged
criminal conduct was both the actual and proximate cause of all of H.P.’s injuries. The
district court’s order awarding H.P.’s mother restitution in the amount of $11,883.29 to
reimburse her for her out-of-pocket expenses related to the treatment of those injuries
should therefore be affirmed.

2.

Payments By The CVCP

Nebrensky also challenges the district court’s award of restitution to the CVCP,
arguing “the State did not meet its burden to show that H.P.’s medical expenses for which
the CVCP sought reimbursement resulted from Mr. Nebrensky’s two charged offenses.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.) Once again, a review of the record belies Nebrensky’s
claim.
H.P.’s mother testified that, in addition to having personally expended over
$11,000.00 to pay for the treatment of H.P.’s psychological and related medical
conditions that H.P.’s doctors informed her were caused by the sexual abuse, she also
applied for and received compensation from the CVCP for some of H.P.’s treatment
expenses. (Tr., p.31, L.3 – p.32, L.7.) Exhibit 3, introduced by the state at the restitution
hearing, is a letter from the CVCP indicating that the CVCP made payments in the
amount of $1,928.16 on behalf of H.P., and that it did so directly in relation to the
criminal case. (State’s Exhibit 3.) Nancy Lee, the victim advocate through whose
testimony Exhibit 3 was introduced, testified that she worked with the CVCP and was
“familiar with how they operate” and “what they do in regard to witness and
compensation.” (Tr., p.34, Ls.10-22.) She also testified that she assisted H.P.’s mother
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in applying for compensation through the CVCP. (Tr., p.34, L.23 – p.35, L.4.) When
asked if she knew how the CVCP arrived at the dollar amount reflected in State’s Exhibit
3, Ms. Lee testified:
[T]he Crime Victims Compensation Program contacts the providers
directly. They don’t go through the person applying because they want to
make sure it’s correct, and so that’s listed there, and then they go through a
process to make sure it’s crime-related before they pay on it, and then
that’s the amount that – the difference after the insurance has paid ….
(Tr., p.36, Ls.6-19.) Although Ms. Lee agreed she did not “have information as to how
[the CVCP] arrived at this particular conclusion other than in a general sense” (Tr., p.37,
Ls.6-11), she testified that the CVCP’s “process is pretty good with that” (Tr., p.37,
Ls.13-14).
Nebrensky’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the foregoing evidence
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the district award of restitution to the CVCP.
Viewed collectively, that evidence shows that the payments the CVCP made on H.P.’s
behalf were to reimburse H.P.’s mother for the expenses she incurred for the treatment of
H.P.’s injuries that, according to H.P.’s doctors, were directly related to the sexual abuse.
Nebrensky has failed to show the district court abused its discretion by awarding the
requested restitution.

D.

Nebrensky Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Ordering Him To Make Full Restitution To H.P.’s Mother And The CVCP,
Despite His Inability To Pay
The district court ordered Nebrensky to make full restitution to H.P.’s mother and

the CVCP, finding the state had “proven well beyond a preponderance of the evidence
that every … item requested [was] related to the abuse perpetrated by” Nebrensky. (Tr.,
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p.91, L.21 – p.92, L.2.) In doing so, the court specifically recognized that, “in all
likelihood,” Nebrensky would not make a payment for at least “five or six years because
of the sentence [the court] imposed,” and that, in “reality,” H.P.’s mother would “never
see a single penny for her efforts.” (Tr., p.94, Ls.8-17.) Nebrensky now challenges the
district court’s restitution award, arguing the “court should have placed more weight on
[his] current and future ability to pay.” (Appellant’s brief, p.27.) Nebrensky’s argument
is unsupported by the record and the law and fails to show an abuse of discretion.
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed to the
trial court’s discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412, 417 (Ct. App.
2013). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate
court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistently with applicable legal standards, and reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
Idaho’s restitution statute provides that the sentencing court “shall” order
restitution for economic loss actually suffered by the victim. I.C. § 19-5304(2).
Nevertheless, the court may decline to order restitution or order less than full restitution
after considering other factors, including “the financial resources, needs, and earning
ability of the defendant.” I.C. § 19-5304(3) and (7). While a district court is required to
consider these factors, inability to pay neither precludes nor limits a restitution award;
rather, ability to pay is only one factor for a court’s consideration when it makes a
discretionary restitution determination. State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708,
710 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App.
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2003)). In addition, “[t]he immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not
be, in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution.” I.C. § 19-5304(7).
Nebrensky does not argue that the district court failed to consider his ability to
pay, only that it “failed to exercise reason in its decision because” it did not give
Nebrensky’s ability to pay “more weight.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.27.)

Nebrensky’s

argument is without merit. The district court had no obligation to reduce the award of
restitution to which the victims were entitled merely because Nebrensky lacked the
financial resources to pay. I.C. § 19-5304(7). The court specifically recognized that
Nebrensky may never make a payment but determined, in an exercise of discretion, that
an award of restitution in the full amount requested by the state was appropriate in light
of the evidence showing that Nebrensky caused substantial harm to the victim. (Tr., p.91,
L.21 – p.94, L.17.) The district’s court’s decision is supported both by the record and the
applicable law, and by the plea agreement wherein Nebrensky specifically agreed to pay
any restitution owing as a result of his charged criminal conduct.

(See R., p.37.)

Nebrensky has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s Order of
Restitution.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Lori A. Fleming________
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